Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including those involved in internal trafficking and officials accused of complicity, and seek adequate penalties for convicted traffickers, which should involve significant prison terms. * Increase the availability of protection services for all trafficking victims – including for victims outside the capital, male victims, and victims requiring long-term care – including by partnering with and allocating funding to civil society. * Allocate financial and in-kind resources to support anti-trafficking efforts, including the national anti-trafficking task force and implementation of the 2019-2024 NAP. * Train officials, including law enforcement, labor inspectors, and social workers, on the use of standard victim identification procedures and the national referral mechanism to proactively identify and refer trafficking victims to care. * Improve collaboration between anti-trafficking police units, immigration, labor, and judicial authorities. * Train law enforcement and judicial officials on identifying, investigating, and prosecuting trafficking cases. * Increase labor inspections in the informal sector and mining regions to improve identification of trafficking cases, including child forced labor. * Increase efforts to raise public awareness of human trafficking, including internal trafficking.

The government decreased law enforcement efforts. The 2021 Revised Act to Ban Trafficking in Persons Within the Republic of Liberia criminalized sex and labor trafficking and prescribed minimum sentences of 20 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as kidnapping.

The government investigated nine trafficking cases involving 13 suspects and continued investigations of six cases involving nine suspects. This compared with investigating eight trafficking cases involving 12 suspects in the previous reporting period. The government initiated the prosecution of one defendant. This compared with prosecuting 13 defendants in the previous reporting period. Courts did not convict any traffickers, compared with four convictions during the previous reporting period. Officials continued to lack understanding of internal trafficking crimes, and some continued to view forms of trafficking, especially of children in domestic servitude, as a culturally acceptable practice rather than a crime. In addition, some prosecutors may have pursued other charges, including rape and child endangerment in lieu of sex trafficking or forced labor, because of a lack of understanding of the crime. A lack of centralized record keeping further hindered law enforcement efforts.

The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials complicit in human trafficking crimes. Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action. After an investigation into trafficking allegations involving a Liberian diplomat in the United States that occurred during previous reporting periods, authorities in the United States did not bring criminal charges. Observers reported some court clerks and prosecutors allegedly required bribes to schedule trafficking cases.

The Liberian National Police (LNP) Anti-Trafficking in Persons Unit was the primary investigator of trafficking cases. The Ministry of Labor (MOL) had the authority to prosecute trafficking and child labor cases. The Liberian Immigration Service (LIS) and Liberia Drug Enforcement Agency investigated transnational trafficking cases. The LIS Anti-Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Unit, comprised of 14 officers, stationed at least one officer at each of Liberia’s five major ports of entry and other minor ports of entry. The LNP lacked basic resources and equipment to fully respond to and investigate trafficking allegations, especially outside the capital. The National Anti-Human Trafficking Taskforce (NATT) organized a training event for law enforcement officials to strengthen prosecutions of trafficking cases. Officials and NGOs reported many police, prosecutors, judges, and labor inspectors lacked sufficient resources, impeding trafficking investigations and prosecutions. The government cooperated with Sierra Leonean authorities on anti-trafficking law enforcement activities.

The government made mixed efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims. The government reported identifying 157 trafficking victims, compared with 154 victims during the previous reporting period. Of the 157 victims, two were sex trafficking victims, both women, four were labor trafficking victims, all men, and 151 were victims of unspecified forms of trafficking, including one child and 150 women. NGOs identified an additional 40 victims of unspecified forms of trafficking, all women. Of the 157 identified trafficking victims, the government reported referring 25 victims to government and NGO services; this compared with referring 122 victims to services in the previous reporting period. The government assisted in repatriating potential Liberian trafficking victims from Oman. The government provided $1,500 of in-kind assistance to victims, including material and training to start businesses. The government had SOPs and an NRM to identify trafficking victims and refer them to care. However, law enforcement, immigration, and social services personnel lacked training on such procedures and, at times, misidentified trafficking victims as victims of other crimes. The government reported providing $12,000 in funding for government services; however, the majority of the funding for victim assistance came from an international organization.

The MOL operated three shelters dedicated to assisting trafficking victims and completed renovations on two of the shelters initiated in the previous reporting period. The three shelters could accommodate a total of 40 victims, including men, women, and children, and one shelter was dedicated exclusively to female trafficking victims. Observers noted anecdotal reports two of the MOL shelters may not have been fully operational. The Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection (MOGCSP) operated shelters for GBV victims, including trafficking victims. The government did not report how many victims were assisted at the MOL or MOGCSP shelters. The government arranged for an international NGO to provide shelter and services for child victims of neglect and abuse, which could also provide short-term shelter to child trafficking victims. In addition, the MOGSCP operated several transit centers that could provide medical services and short-term accommodations to victims of GBV and other vulnerable populations, including trafficking victims. Each transit center should have a social worker, a nurse trained in sexual- and GBV cases, and a police officer on staff; however, most transit centers operated with limited staff and resources and were unable to provide adequate services. Twelve LNP Women and Children Protection Section (WACPS) facilities could provide short-term accommodations to child victims of crime, and occasionally adult victims, but lacked basic amenities. Two MOGCSP social workers continued to work inside the WACPS to assist women and children, including trafficking victims, and visit police precincts to coordinate cases.

Resource constraints limited services for trafficking victims, especially in rural areas. The government relied heavily on NGOs and private shelters when government shelters were unavailable but did not report providing sufficient financial or in-kind assistance. Shelter and services were available to domestic and foreign victims. Adult victims were allowed to leave the shelters at will but subject to a curfew. Shelters sometimes could not protect victims’ identities, and victims could usually stay only three to six months because of capacity limitations. MOGSCP could arrange foster care for child victims requiring long-term care. The MOGSCP continued collaborating with NGOs through regular meetings of the Child Protection Network.

Victims were not required to participate in investigations and prosecutions to access protection services. The government provided victim-witness assistance to support participation in criminal justice proceedings. The government could provide transportation, legal assistance, and shelter services. In one case, the government provided funding to relocate a victim-witness from an MOL shelter due to safety reasons. The anti-trafficking law allowed victims to obtain restitution. Victims could file civil suits against traffickers, although no victims filed largely because of a lack of awareness and the prohibitive costs of retaining an attorney. The government did not have a formal policy that provided alternatives to removal to countries in which victims would face retribution or hardship but could offer temporary residency on a case-by-case basis. Due to a lack of training, insufficient resources, and inconsistent application of victim identification procedures, authorities may have detained unidentified trafficking victims.

The government decreased efforts to prevent human trafficking. The MOL coordinated the government’s anti-trafficking efforts and co-chaired the NATT with the Ministry of Justice. The task force also included representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and MOGCSP; it continues to meet regularly. The government continued implementing the 2019-2024 NAP to combat trafficking in persons; however, it did not report allocating funds to support its implementation. In addition, the government did not report allocating funds to combat human trafficking in the 2024 budget compared with allocating $230,170 in the 2023 budget. The government conducted some activities to raise public awareness of trafficking, including through radio ads in various languages. The government reported spending $32,000 on prevention efforts, which included the MOL allocation of $5,000 to fund a trafficking and child labor awareness campaign led by trafficking survivors exploited in Oman. The government discontinued a previously reported campaign, which had collaborated with 10 local NGOs, that raised awareness in all 15 counties in Liberia.

The government supported an international organization in training officials, civil society organizations, labor commissioners, agriculture workers, and organizations on trafficking and child labor. The MOL continued to operate an anti-trafficking hotline during business hours, though observers noted it did not always appear to be operational. The government reported receiving 5,959 trafficking-related calls, but, unlike previous reporting period, it did not report referring any calls to LNP for investigation. The government conducted labor inspections but did not report identifying any child labor or trafficking victims due to those inspections. The government did not report whether inspectors received anti-trafficking training. The MOL, in collaboration with an international organization, continued its child labor mapping exercise to identify relevant community leaders and educate local officials about child labor and human trafficking issues. The government required all labor recruiters to be licensed by the government. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel or peacekeepers.

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Liberia, and traffickers exploit victims from Liberia abroad. Trafficking inside the country is more prevalent than transnational trafficking, and the majority of victims are children. Traffickers recruit and exploit most trafficking victims in the country’s borders in domestic servitude, forced begging, sex trafficking, or forced labor in street vending, gold and alluvial diamond mines, and on small-scale rubber plantations. Traffickers typically operate independently and are commonly family members who promise impoverished relatives a better life for their children or promise young women a better life for themselves. Traffickers take the children or women to urban areas and exploit them in forced labor in street vending, domestic service, or sex trafficking. Traffickers are also often well-respected community members who exploit the “foster care” system common across West Africa. Liberian law requires parents to register children within 14 days of birth; while about two-thirds of children younger than the age of five are registered, only about 30 percent have obtained a birth certificate. Although the government has expanded birth registration accessibility, continued lack of birth registration and identity documents increase individuals’ vulnerability to trafficking.

Traffickers exploit orphaned children in street vending and child sex trafficking. Intercountry adoption regulations remain unenforced, leaving children vulnerable to exploitation. Some parents encourage their daughters’ exploitation in sex trafficking to supplement family income. Liberian nationals and, to a lesser extent, foreigners exploit children in sex trafficking in Monrovia. Traffickers allegedly compel children to sell illicit drugs. In the past, officials have identified trafficking victims in Liberia from the People’s Republic of China, Malaysia, and India. Nationals from other West African countries, including Sierra Leone and Guinea operate in Liberia. Traffickers exploit a small number of Liberian men, women, and children in other West African countries, including Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. In the past, traffickers exploited Liberian victims in Thailand, Lebanon, and Finland. Traffickers exploit Liberian women for forced labor in the Middle East, including Oman. Some government employees may have been directly complicit in child trafficking, including for domestic service and street vending, and reports indicate law enforcement occasionally accept bribes from suspected traffickers.